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NOTE

TRADE UNIONS IN COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
COUNTRIES: THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL STATUS

The basic concept of Caribbean labour law has been the acceptance
of the common law principle that the relationship between a master and
his servant or an employer and his employee is based upon the individual
contract of employment. "Everything hinges upon this individual contract
of employment" ' which the parties enter into freely upon terms agreed
between themselves. This assumes equality between the contracting parties
but tends to ignore other social and economic considerations which may
make this equality, and its underlying freedom, imaginary. The bargaining power of the employee vis-t-vis his employer is negligible. Thus, if
the employer is to be met squarely on his own ground, the need for
workmen to pool their bargaining power by presenting a united front
becomes palpable.
The common law did not provide the legal guarantee for freedom
of association since such "combinations" were, in most cases, considered
to be illegal as being in restraint of trade. However, in Britain, as well
as in Caribbean countries, the position has been altered by legislation,
and the legal basis of the freedom to organise can be found in trade union
2
legislation.
The Jamaica and Trinidad trade union statutes provide that the
purposes of any trade union "shall not, by reason merely that they are
in restraint of trade, be deemed to be unlawful, so as to render any member of such trade union liable to criminal prosecution for conspiracy or
otherwise. '" Furthermore, the purposes of any trade union "shall not, by
reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, be unlawful so as to
render void or voidable any agreement or trust."' 4

In order to comprehend the significance of the above sections it is
essential to briefly examine the doctrine of restraint of trade as it affects
*LL.M., Ph.D., London, Faculty of Law; University of the West Indies.
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trade unions. The doctrine is a common law concept based upon the idea
of free enterprise. It provides that a person cannot covenant in such a
way as to restrict the right of another to carry out his trade or profession.
The doctrine has been used to pronounce most trade unions as illegal
5
combinations. Thus in Hornby v. Close, a society, which had as its main
objects those of a trade union and the support of its members when on
strike, was held to have an illegal purpose, restraining trade, not 6enforceable at law. A similar conclusion was reached in Rigby v. Connol.
In Swaine v. Wilson,7 however, it was shown that trade unions were
not always illegal at common law. In that case Lord Esher, M.R., said:
I think, even where some of the rules of a society are in restraint
of trade and as such illegal, if the general objects of the society are
not illegal, the existence of those rules, though they would not be
enforced, would not prevent the enforcement of rules in favour of
members which are not in restraint of trade or otherwise illegal.
Therefore, as the rule on which the plaintiff founds his action is not
tainted with that vice, and the society is not illegal in its funda8
mental object, I think he can enforce that rule.
The uncertainty created by some trade unions being pronounced
illegal at common law, while others were not, was well described by Lord
Macnaghten in these words:
A trade union is merely an unincorporated society of individuals.
The designation does not of itself impart illegality. There have been
many and probably there may be still more trade unions lawful in
every point of view, and not depending for their legality or for their
immunity on the Act of 1871 .... 9
Whereas some trade unions were unlawful at common law in the
sense that their agreements could not be enforced, this did not imply that
10
they were criminal. Although in R. v. Bykerdike it was held that a
combination of workers for the purpose of dictating to employers what
workers they must employ was indictable, and Crompton, J. expressed a
11
similar view in Hilton v. Eckersley; the better and more consistent view
seems to be that while the objects of an association may be unlawful, in
the sense of being void in restraint of trade and contrary to public policy,
12
they are not unlawful as being within the criminal law. In Swaine v.
Wilson Lindley L.J. declared:
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The general proposition, that every society which has rules in restraint
of trade is unlawful, i.e., criminal, and that its members are punishable
at common law, was denied by the court in R. v. Stainer and cannot
be supported. . . . Such societies are not necessarily indictable as
nuisances or as conspiracies, and their rules although in restraint of
trade are not necessarily unlawful in any criminal sense. Whether
such rules can be enforced by civil legal proceedings is quite another
matter, and depends mainly on the reasonableness of the rules. But
even if some rules of a society cannot be enforced, it by no means
follows that other rules of the same society cannot .... 13
Having briefly stated the common law position operative in Caribbean
countries prior to the enactment of trade union statutes, we may now
investigate what changes the foregoing sections have brought in the law.
Section 3 of the Jamaica Trade Union Act and S. 5 (1) of the
Trinidad Trade Unions Ordinance exempt members of trade unions from
criminal prosecution, although, as is already seen, the common law did
not regard members of a trade union to be criminally responsible for
having rules in restraint of trade. It is believed that these sections simply
repeat the common law position and are, therefore, merely declaratory
of it. However, S. 4 of the Jamaica Trade Union Act and S. 5 (2) of
the Trinidad Trade Unions Ordinance have also removed the civil disability of trade unions and, by doing so, have taken care of the uncertainty of the common law position as to when a trade union would or
would not be illegal as being in restraint of trade.
The Legislatures, however, while prepared to legalise the activities
of trade unions within certain limits, have not been prepared to make
all the rules of trade unions or any agreements which trade unions might
make with one another enforceable in the courts. Nor have they been
prepared to give trade unions power to sue their members for subscriptions, or to give members of trade unions power to sue their unions for
benefits or similar payments. Therefore, where a trade union has to rely
on S. 5 (2) of the Trinidad Trade Unions Ordinance to enforce its contracts, it is provided by S. 614 that:
Nothing in this Ordinance shall enable any court to entertain any
legal proceedings instituted with the object of directly enforcing or
recovering damages for the breach of any agreement:
(a) between members of a trade union as such concerning the conditions on which any members for the time being of the union
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shall or shall not sell their goods, transact business, employ, or
be employed; or
(b) for the payment by any person of any subscription or penalty
to a trade union; or
(c) for the application of the funds of a trade union,
(i) to provide benefits to members; or
(ii) to furnish contributions to any employer or workman not
a member of that union, in consideration of the employer
or workman acting in conformity with the rules or resolutions of that union; or
(iii) to discharge any fine imposed upon any person by sentence
of a court of justice; or
(d) made between one trade union and another; 15 or
(e) any bond to secure the performance of any of the abovementioned
agreements.
Nothing in this section shall be deemed to constitute any of the
above-mentioned agreements unlawful.
If it were not for this section, a trade union could successfully sue a
member who refused to go on strike when required by the rules of his
trade union to do so, and an employers' trade union could successfully
sue an employees' trade union, and vice versa, for any breach of an
agreement between them.
The foregoing section is a reproduction of S. 4 of the British Trade
Union Act, 1871, which has been the subject of litigation in United
Kingdom courts. It is not aimed here to scrutinize these judgments
in any detail. 16 It seems sufficient, for our purpose, to mention that the
section has been subject to a restrictive interpretation such that there
must be direct enforcement of his contractual rights as opposed to an indirect enforcement for the section to be pleaded. Consequently, the wording of the section does not prevent the court from entertaining an action
of a member of a trade union who claims to have been wrongfully expelled for an alleged breach of the rules, because a declaration to that
effect, or an injunction preventing his wrongful expulsion, is not a direct enforcement of his contractual right to benefits under the union
rules.
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It is to be pointed out, once again, that it is only if a trade union
is illegal at common law, as being in restraint of trade, that the section
is applicable. Where a trade union is not in restraint of trade at common
law, it can enforce its agreements independently of the statutory provisions. 17 However, where a lawful union sues or is sued in its registered
name, the capacity to sue or be sued is derived entirely from the registration provisions of the Ordinance. In such a situation, S. 6 should apply
to prevent such an action at least in types of agreements specified in the
section. Therefore, since all trade unions in Trinidad and Tobago, and all
other Caribbean countries, are required to be registered, one of the effects of registration is to prevent direct enforcements of agreements specified in S. 6, irrespective of whether or not the trade union concerned is
deemed lawful at common law.
The Caribbean legislatures, after having freed trade unions from the
difficulties encountered under strict application of the common law doctrine of restraint of trade to their agreements, have proceeded to provide a system of registration of trade unions.
Both the Jamaica and Trinidad trade union statutes make it compulsory for every trade union to register. Under the Jamaica statute,
upon the establishment of a trade union, the committee or management,
or the trustees, or other directing authority, must make application for
registration within thirty days after the date of establishment, 18 whereas
under the Trinidad Ordinance any seven or more members of a trade
union may, after receiving written permission from the Registrar, register
the union within six months of such permission. 19 In the event of failure
to comply with the statutory requirements, a fine may be imposed on
summary conviction so long as the union remains unregistered. 20 A penalty
is also imposed if any person, after registration of a trade union has been
refused or cancelled, takes part in any meeting or proceedings of such a
trade union, knowing that such union is not registered. 21
An application for registration of a trade union, which is submitted
to the Registrar, must be accompanied by prints of the rules and a list
of tides and names of officers of the trade union. 22 On receipt of the application, the Registrar must register the union if he is satisfied that
the trade union has complied with the registration regulations. 23 Where
registration is compulsory, the grounds of refusal assume importance.
The wider the grounds of refusal, the more severe the conditions which
a trade union is asked to fulfill in order to be registered. Also, wide
grounds for refusal of registration may give the Registrar appreciable
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scope to interpret. It therefore becomes necessary to narrowly define
the grounds. A common ground of refusal in Caribbean countries is that
the objects of the union are unlawful or that the application does not
meet the statutory requirements, e.g., the applicant union bears a name
identical to that of an existing registered union, or so nearly24 resembles
such name, as to be likely to deceive members of the public. Where a
person considers himself to be aggrieved by the refusal of the Registrar
as a trade union, he has a right of appeal to
to register a combination
25
Court.
the Supreme
A certificate of registration, which the Registrar issues, unless proved
to have been withdrawn or cancelled, is conclusive evidence that the
regulations with respect to registry have been complied with and that
26
the combination is a trade union. However, it is not per se conclusive on
the subject of the validity of the rules of the union, and the court is entitled to ignore the certification and inquire ex proprio motu whether any
of the purposes of the union is unlawful.
The Registrar may withdraw the certificate of registration if any
alteration is made to the constitution of the union whereby the principal
objects cease to be in compliance with the statutory purposes. The certification of registration may also be withdrawn or cancelled by the
Registrar in any of the following cases:
1. At the request of the union to be evidenced in such manner as
the Registrar may from time to time direct;
2.

On proof to his satisfaction that
(i)

the certification of registration was obtained by fraud or
mistake;

(ii)

any of the union's purposes is illegal;

(iii)

the union has wilfully (after due notice given to it) violated the provisions of the trade union statute in force;

(iv)

27
the union has ceased to exist.

However, two important safeguards are provided. First, the Registrar must give two months notice to the union concerned of his intention
to withdraw or cancel the certificate of registration and must specify the
grounds for so doing, except where the withdrawal or cancellation is at
the request of the trade union, or the Registrar is satisfied that any of
it is his duty
the union's purposes is unlawful. In the latter circumstance
21
after such
Secondly,
to cancel the certificate of registration forthwith.
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a withdrawal or cancellation, the trade union may appeal the ruling to the
Supreme Court. 29 When the withdrawal or cancellation becomes effective,
the union concerned ceases to enjoy, as such, the privileges of a registered
trade union, but liabilities incurred while the union was registered may
be enforced against it as if such withdrawal or cancelling had not taken
place. 30
Upon completion of registration, a trade union is recognised to exist
under statutory protection and consequently enjoys certain privileges.
Trade union officials and members are protected, by a clause similar to
S. 1 of the British Trades Disputes Act of 1906, from prosecution for
criminal conspiracy where the agreements entered into, are not for the
commission of an offence.3 1 However, the greatest immunity given to a
trade union is stated in the following words:
An action against a trade union, whether of workmen or masters,
or against any members or officials thereof on behalf of themselves and all other members of the trade union in respect of
any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf
of the trade union, shall not be entertained by any Court.32
The foregoing provisions therefore exempt trade unions from an action in tort of any kind committed by themselves or on their behalf.
Similarly, the statutes seek to grant protection to individual members as
follows:
An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of
a trade dispute shall not be actionable on the ground only that
it induces some other person to break a contract of employment
or that it is an interference with the trade, business, or employment of some other person, or with the right of some other
person to dispose of his capital or his labour as he wills. 33
It may be observed that immunity is restricted to contracts of employment. Moreover, the English courts have interpreted similar provisions in the British Trade Disputes Act of 1906, 34 upon which the Caribbean statutory provisions are based, in such a way as to give little practical protection. Indubitably, this is the state of affairs after Rookes v.
Barnard,35 wherein the House of Lords held that threats to break a contract can amount to the tort of intimidation in much the same way as
threats of violence, and that Ss. 1 and 3 of the Trade Disputes Acts of
1906, do not provide any protection to the individual union members in
case of such intimidation.
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In Rookes, the British Overseas Airways Corporation (B.O.A.C.) had
entered into an agreement in 1949 with their draughtsmen's union, the
Association of Engineering & Shipbuilding Draughtsmen. This agreement
banned all strikes and lockouts and also provided that any dispute not
settled by the parties should be referred to arbitration. The union also
had an informal agreement with the company that all employees should
be union members. The plaintiff, Douglas Rookes, was employed as a
draughtsman in the design office at London Airport. He had been an
officer of the A.E.S.D. but had resigned his membership as a result of a
disagreement over union policy. Thereupon the union, anxious to preserve
its 100% membership standing, passed a resolution stating that, if Mr.
Rookes was not removed from the design office, all its members would
strike. The company, notified of this resolution, suspended Rookes and
later dismissed him, giving him a week's pay in lieu of notice. Rookes
sued the defendant union officials for damages for conspiring to threaten
the company with strike action and thus inducing the company to terminate its contract with him. In a special verdict on the facts, the jury
found the defendants to be party to a conspiracy to threaten strike action
to procure Mr. Rooke's discharge and awarded him £7,500 damages.
Sachs J., the trial judge, held that the threats to strike in breach of the
agreement were unlawful acts; that as such they were acts constituting
actionable intimidation; that the acts harmed Rookes; and that the union
officials were not protected by the Trade Disputes Act of 1906.36 The
Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that although some kinds
of intimidation can be tortious, a mere threat to break one's own contract
37
is not such a "wrongful act" as is necessary to constitute the tort.
The House of Lords in turn reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeal.38 Their Lordships, verifying the existence of the tort of intimidation, held that it was committed by threatening the breach of one's own
contract and, therefore, that the union officials had consipired to commit
the tort of intimidation.
The House of Lords rejected a distinction, stressed by the Court of
Appeal, between a threat to commit a tort and a threat to break a contract. Lord Reid said explicitly that "there is no technical reason requiring such a distinction between different kinds of threats," and that he saw
no other ground for making any such distinction. 39 The House of Lords
relied on two Irish cases"0 for the proposition that a threat to call a strike
in breach of contract is an unlawful act. Only on the quantum of damages
did their Lordships order a new trial.
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Accordingly, the right to threaten a strike action which, if taken,
would be in breach of the individual contracts of the strikers, has been
severely confined. Professor Rideout has summed up the effect of Rookes
v. Barnard on S.3 of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, (on which the
Caribbean statutory provisions are based) in the following words:
The effect of this decision is to make it clear that a third party injured by pressure on an employer, at least if the injury is intended,
can sue without thought of this section (S.3 of the 1906 Act), since
if he has a cause of action in intimidation or inducement of breach
of contract, of necessity there will be sufficient extraneous unlawful
action to negative the protection. Only where employees are induced
to break their contracts with their own employer without any other
unlawful element and without resulting in injury to third parties will
the section be effective to prevent an action which would otherwise
exist.4 1
With the enactment of the Trade Disputes Act of 1965 (U.K.), the
effect of Rookes v. Barnard insofar as industrial conflicts are concerned
has been nullified. Even the British courts, themselves, have shown the
tendency, in subsequent labour cases, to narrow down the area of application of Rookes v. Barnard.4 2 It is to be hoped that in the Caribbean,
where Rookes v. Barnard is considered to 'be a binding authority,43 necessary steps would be taken to neutralize the effect of that case.
We may now turn to limits imposed by the Caribbean Legislatures on
the legitimate functions of a trade union. A trade union is defined in the
Jamaica Trade Union Act as
• . . any combination whether temporary or permanent, the principal
purposes of which are, under its constitution, the regulation of the
relations between workmen 44 and masters, or between workmen and
workmen, or 'between masters and masters whether such combination
would or would not, if this law had not been enacted, have been
deemed to have been an unlawful combination by reason of some
one or more of its purposes being in restraint of trade:
Provided that nothing in this Act(a)

shall affect(i)

any agreement between partners as to their own business;

(ii)

any agreement between an employer and those employed
by him as to such employment;
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(iii)

(b)

any agreement in consideration of the sale of goodwill of
a business or an instruction in any profession, trade or
handicraft;

shall preclude any trade union from providing benefits for its
members; . . .45

In the Trinidad and Tobago Trade Unions Ordinance a trade union
is defined as any combination, whether temporary or permanent, the
principal objects of which are:
1. the regulation of relations between
(a) workmen and masters; or
(b) between workmen and workmen; or
(c) between masters and masters; or
2. the imposing of restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade
the principal object
or business. 46 A trade union may also 4include
7
members.
its
for
of providing benefits
These objects are described in the Ordinance and known in law as
the "statutory objects" of a trade union. Excluded from the above definitions is any agreement between an employer and his employees as to such
employment, and any agreement in consideration of the sale of the goodwill of a business or of instruction in any profession, trade or handicraft.
What is necessary in the foregoing definitions is that, in order to
determine whether or not a combination is a trade union, regard is to be
had to the objects of such a combination and not to the members who
compose it. The test of a trade union, in the words of Lord Hanworth,
48s
Therefore, the statutory definitions are
"is its objects, not its personnel.
such as manufacturers' associaassociations,
trade
wide enough to include
are not concerned with the
which
societies,
tions, and trade protection
the exclusively commercial
have
but
all
at
conduct of industrial relations
or maintaining fixed
output
limiting
object of restricting competition,
wholesale or retail prices.
The principal objects which a trade union may have are limited to
one or more statutory objects. If none of the principal objects of a combination is, in fact, a statutory object, then such a combination will not
come within the definition of a trade union. In order to find out what the
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principal objects of a combination are, the court or the Registrar is not
specifically restricted to the "object clause" of the rule book. The constitution must be studied as a whole.
There is nothing in the statutory definitions to suggest that objects
of trade unions as specified therein are the only legitimate objects of a
trade union. In addition to its principal objects, a trade union may have
other objects, provided only that they are not unlawful. A trade union may,
therefore, run a journal or a newspaper, or conduct an investment business, etc. The word "unlawful" in this context means unlawful for a trade
union. It does not include objects which are classified as unlawful for the
sole reason that they are in restraint of trade. If any object is unlawful
the registration of the union is void and the Registrar would have power
to cancel the registration.
At common law, a trade union is deemed to be an unincorporated
association of individuals and does not have a separate existence from its
individual members. The question arises whether, with the introduction
of trade union legislation, the position has changed. Trade union statutes
in the Caribbean do not contain any express provision with regard to the
status of a trade union. However, in most reported trade union cases which
have come before the Caribbean courts, trade unions have been assumed
to have the capacity to sue and be sued in their registered names.4 9 These
cases quoted with approval and relied upon Tall Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc. of Ry. Servants50 and National Union of General & Municipal
Workers v. Gillian51 to arrive at this conclusion.
Asserting the union's status in Ta/ Vale, wherein it was held that a
trade union may be sued in its registered name, Lord Brampton stated:
I think that a legal entity was created under the Trade Union Act,
1871, by the registration of the society in its present name in the
manner prescribed and that the legal entity so created, though not
perhaps in the strict sense a corporation is, nevertheless, a newly
created corporate body created by statute, distinct from the unincorporated trade union, consisting of many thousands of separate
individuals, which no longer exists under any other name. 52
In National Union of General & Municipal Workers v. Gillian, in
which the English Court of Appeal affirmed the right of a trade union
to sue in its registered name for damages for a tort committed against
the union, Scott, L. J. stated:
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Counsel for the first two appellants says, justly, that a registered
trade union as defined by the Trade Union (Amendment) Act, 1876,
S. 16, is neither a natural person, nor a corporation; and contends
that, because it is neither of those, it can have no powers, and indeed
no existence, except what may have been conferred in express terms
by Parliament in the relevant statutes affecting registered trade unions.
But that argument is fallacious. There is a tertium quid. A trade union
has many activities; it has some existence; and it is something. The
omission of Parliament to christen it with some new generic name is
immaterial; for Parliament has absolute sovereignty and can make
new legal creatures if it likes. It is able, for instance, to create a
persona juridica not previously known to law if it so chooses; or to
clothe an existing association of natural persons with what I may
call co-operative personality, so as to give it the status of a persona
juridica. In my view, that is just what it did in 1871. It expressly
assumed the possession by every trade union, when duly registered of
so many of the main attributes of judicial personality that I find any
other inference of the intention of Parliament impossible.53
From this, it follows that a trade union is a legal entity which can
bring certain actions.
It seems surprising that the Caribbean trade union cases54 did not
refer to the conflicting views of the Court of Appeal and the House of
Lords concerning the status of a trade union in Bonsor v. Musicians'
Union.55 In Bonsor's case, in the Court of Appeal, Lord Evershed M.R.
and Jenkin L.J., while admitting that Parliament has the right and power
to create an entity not previously known to the law, declared that Parliament did not intend to confer a distinct legal status upon a registered
trade union. But Denning L.J. did not agree with this view when he said
that "a trade union is a legal entity with a personality in law comparable to that of a corporation. It is not, perhaps, an entire corporation,
but it has many of the attributes of one ....
.
In the House of Lords both Lords Morton and Porter were of the
opinion that a trade union is a legal entity distinct from its individual
members. In arriving at this conclusion, both of them relied substantially on the decision of the House of Lords in Ta/ Vale Ry. Co. v. Amal56
gamated Soc. oj Ry. Servants.
On the other hand, Lords MacDermott, Keith and Somervell took
the view that a trade union is not a distinct persona juridica. Lord Mac-
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Dermott was of the opinion that the Legislature, in providing for registration and in conferring privileges, intended "to bestow on registered trade
unions some of the gifts and attributes of legal personality 'but had no
intention of doing more and was, indeed, averse to the idea of going the
whole length and making those unions new creatures, distinct in law
from their membership." 57 This being his view of the statutory provisions,
Lord MacDermott then scrutinized the various expressions of judicial
opinion 58 which were relied upon as supporting the view that a trade
union is a judicial person. In his opinion, insofar as they recognised that
the Legislature has bestowed on a trade union some of the characteristics
of a judicial person or established that trade unions as such may be sued,
they still fall short of establishing the proposition of a full juristic personality.
The interpretation of Lord Keith's statement 59 is that, while a registered trade union is not a legal entity in the sense of possessing a full
corporate status, it nevertheless has many of the characteristics which
would normally be assigned to a full legal entity 60 and which do not relate
to a voluntary association. Thus, a trade union assumes, in his words, "a
collective responsibility for all members past, present and future, in respect of any cause of action for which it may be liable, irrespective of the
date of the cause of action. On the other hand, the judgment creditor can
look only to the funds of such a trade union to satisfy his debt and to the
extent to which these may be augmented from time to time by contributions of members, whether new or old, they will still be available for the
unsatisfied judgment creditor."' 61 Accordingly, it is neither right nor
wrong to name it an entity; and, whereas in legal theory it may not be
an entity, in practice, with regard to the subject matter of a particular
62
action, it may be treated as a legal entity.
Caribbean trade union statutes have given the cloak of legality to trade
unions, and the Caribbean courts have granted them a quasi-corporate
status. However, it may be asked whether it is prudent to leave the legal
status of trade unions to the whims of courts whose future attitude cannot
be foretold. Owing to this uncertainty, if not for any other reason, it is
submitted that trade union statutes in the Caribbean be amended to confer
corporate status on trade unions, as was done by the Ghana (then Gold
63
Coast) Trade Union Ordinance in 1941.

R.L. CHAUDHARY
LL.M., Ph.D.
University of the West Indies
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NOTES
1Kahn-Freund, 0., "Legal Framework in Flanders," A. and Clegg, H.A. (eds.)
The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain [1954], p. 45.
2
Trade Union Act, 1871 (U.K.); Antigua Trade Unions Act, Laws of Antigua,
1962, Ch. 376; Bahamas Industrial Relations Act No. 14 of 1970; Barbados Trade
Union Act No. 2 of 1964; British Honduras (Belize) Trade Unions Ordinance, Laws
of British Honduras, 1958, Ch. 142; Dominica Trade Unions & Trade Disputes
Ordinance, Laws of Dominica, 1961, Ch. 120; Grenada Trade Unions & Trade Disputes Ordinance, Laws of Grenada, 1958, Ch. 297; Guyana Trades Unions Act, Laws
of Guyana, 1970, Cap. 98:03; Jamaica Trade Union Act, Laws of Jamaica, 1973,
Vol. XVIII; Montserrat Trade Unions Act, Laws of Montserrat, 1962, Ch. 322; St.
Christopher, Nevis & Anguilla Trade Unions Act, Laws of St. Christopher, Nevis &
Anguilla, 1961, Ch. 353; St. Lucia Trade Unions & Trade Disputes Ordinance, Laws
of St. Lucia, 1957, Ch. 102; St. Vincent Trade Unions & Trade Disputes Ordinance,
Laws of St. Vincent, 1966, Vol. 4, Ch. 12; Trinidad & Tobago Trade Unions Ordinance, 1950, Ch. 22, No. 9 and Trade Disputes & Protection of Property Ordinance,
1950, Ch. 22, No. 11; Virgin Islands Trade Unions Act, Laws of Virgin 'Islands,
1961, Ch. 258.
Hereafter reference will be made only to countries followed by section numbers.
3
Jamaica, S. 3; Trinidad, S. 5(1). See also Antigua, S. 4(1); Barbados, S. 4(1) ;
Belize, S. 4(1); Dominica, S. 3; Grenada, S. 3; Guyana, S. 5(1); Montserrat, S. 4(1);
St. Kitts, Nevis & Anguilla, S. 4(1); St. Lucia, S. 3; St. Vincent, S. 3; Virgin Islands,
S. 4(1).
4
Jamaica, S. 4; Trinidad, S. 5(2); See also Antigua, S. 4(2); Barbados, S. 4(2);
Belize, S. 4(2) ; Dominica, S. 4; Grenada, S. 4; Guyana, S. 5(2); Montserrat, S. 4(2);
St. Kitts, Nevis & Anguilla, S. 4(2); St. Lucia, S. 4; St. Vincent, S. 4; Virgin Islands, S. 4(2).
5[1867] L.R. 2 Q.B. 153.
6[1880] 14 Ch.D. 482.
7[1890] 24 Q.B.D. 252.
8Ibid., at pp. 257-258. See also Gozney v. Bristol and Trade Provident Society
[1909] 1 K.B. 901; Osborne v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1911]
1 Ch. 540; but contrast Russell v. Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners,
[1912] A.C. 421.
9
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